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SLAVERY RHETORIC AND THE ABORTION DEBATE
'Debora cThreedy*
INTRODUCTION
There are many things that could be, and have been, said about the
question of abortion. This article focuses on the rhetoric of the abortion
debate. Specifically, I discuss how both sides of the abortion debate
have appropriated the image of the slave and used that image as a
rhetorical tool, a metaphor, in making legal arguments. Further, I
examine the effectiveness of this metaphor as a rhetorical tool. Finally,
I question the purposes behind this appropriation, and whether it
reflects a lack of sensitivity to the racial content of the appropriated
image.
"Rhetoric" is a term that is experiencing something of a rebirth in
legal discourse. While it retains for some an explicitly pejorative mean-
ing, that of empty, inflated oratory, a number of legal commentators
have recently returned to a study of rhetoric as part of the larger in-
quiry into the language of law.' As James Boyd White points out, the
classical definition of rhetoric is "the art of persuading the people about
matters of justice and injustice in the public places of the state .... -2
In this classical sense, rhetoric persuades by appeals to reason, the
emotions, or ethics.3 In these terms, law is practically synonymous with
rhetoric. 4 Those who practice law seek to persuade about matters of
* Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. Earlier versions of this paper
were presented at a faculty colloquium in December 1992, and at the National
Association of Ethnic Studies (NAES) Conference on March 5, 1993. Comments
from the University of Utah faculty who participated in the colloquium (particularly
from Boyd Dyer, Karen Engle, John Flynn, Leslie Francis, Wayne McCormack, and
Rita Reusch) and from members of the audience at the NAES Conference proved
invaluable in the development of this paper.
I. See, e.g., JAMEs B. WHrrE, HEcRAcLEs' Bow: EssAys ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS
OF THE LAw (1985) [hereinafter WHrrE, HERACLs' Bow]; Jerry Frug, Argument as
Character, 40 STAN. L. Rav. 869 (1988); Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders,
Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEG. EDUC. 108 (1993); Richard K. Sherwin, A
Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MIcH. L. REv.
543 (1988); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA.
L. Ray. 1545 (1990); James B. White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. Rav. 684 (1985).
2. WHITE, HERAcLS' Bow, supra note 1, at 29.
3. Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 112.
4. "Rhetoric as the art (in Aristotle's word) or craft (in Plato's) of persuasion entails
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justice and injustice; the means of persuasion involve, certainly, reason
and ethics, and less explicitly, the emotions.
Law also shares with rhetoric the attribute of simultaneously focus-
ing and limiting understanding. Legal rhetoric, like rhetoric generally,
determines not just how we say what we say, but what it is that we
say-how we see the world, how we think about it and explain it, how
we conceive of ourselves and others and our relationships with others.5
The down side of this observation is that if legal rhetoric allows us to
see, think, and say certain things, it also tends to impede us from
seeing, thinking, and saying other things. 6
Similarly, for many, metaphors are seen as "mere" figures of
speech, of interest primarily to poets and English teachers. Metaphors
entail more than this, however; metaphors create meaning. They are
central to a culture's concepts, values, and structures. The role of meta-
phor in the creation of meaning is explored in a provocative book,
Metaphors We Live By, by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. 7 As an
example of the way in which metaphors are central to a culture's con-
cepts and values, the authors point to the common metaphor "time is
money."8 This basic metaphor shapes our language in many ways: we
spend, invest, waste, and budget our time. More surprisingly, this
metaphor structures many aspects of our daily lives. Not only do we
talk about time as if it were a valuable commodity, we act as if it were;9
lawyers, for example, bill on the basis of time.
But time, of course, is not money, thinking of it as money "isn't a
necessary way for human beings to conceptualize time."10 The meta-
phorical conception of time as money is a reflection of our industrial-
advocacy of a kind that is, as a practical matter, synonymous with lawyering."
Wedaufer, supra note 1, at 1547 n.10.
5. Frug, supra note 1, at 880-81; Wetaufer, supra note 1, at 1548.
6. Wetlaufer, supra note 1, at 1588; see Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34
J. LEG. EDuc. 222, 223 (1984) (discussing Mark Twain's observation that his
training as a riverboat pilot deprived him of the capacity to see the river as a
layperson would). From my own experience as an actor and director, I know that I
see, think, and talk about theater productions differently than my relatives and
friends, who often complain that I "spoil" the show for them by critiquing the
lights, the staging, and other technical elements.
7. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPoHRs Wz LivE By (1980).
8. LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 7-9.
9. The authors give a number of examples: salaries are paid by the hour or year; hotel
rooms are paid for by the day, and interest on loans is paid daily, quarterly, or
annually. LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 8.
l0. LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 9.
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ized culture and the values that it espouses,11 such as productivity and
materialism. Other cultures conceive of time in other ways, reflecting
other cultural values.' 2
Similarly, metaphors create meaning in law. Legal reasoning is
analogical, which is to say that it is metaphorical. The metaphor that
symbolic acts are speech has allowed the Supreme Court to extend First
Amendment protection to the wearing of black armbands. 13 Likewise,
lawyers have argued that oil and gas are comparable to rabbits and
foxes. 14 Lawyers could not argue cases and judges could not decide
them without using metaphors. 15
Ironically, both anti-abortion and pro-choice advocates 16 have used
slave metaphors in legal arguments in cases and law review articles
dealing with abortion. The competing slave metaphors in legal discourse
reflect the struggle that is being played out in contemporary culture
over the meaning of abortion. The competing metaphors are weapons
on a battlefield (another metaphor)' 7 with the stakes being the hearts
11. LAROFF & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 9.
12. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 9. For example, cultures more connected to
the land than our own urban, industrialized culture may conceive of time as cyclic,
productive periods alternating with fallow periods. See, e.g., Eccles. 3:1-8 ("To
everything there is a season...").
13. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commun. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969)
(wearing of black armband by student is protected by First Amendment).
14. RicHARD A. PosNER, LAW AND LrrERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 2
(1988). See also Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204,
206 (Ky. 1934) (comparing natural gas to fox or fish); Lone Star Gas Co. v.
Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 875-77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (citing numerous
references comparing natural gas to wild animals, as well as references criticizing the
analogy).
15. But cf POSNER, supra note 14, at 2-3. Posner argues that there is a difference
between the poet's use of metaphor and simile and the lawyer's use of reasoning by
analogy. The poet compares things that are dramatically, even shockingly, unlike in
order to create an effect of vividness and novelty, while the lawyer argues for the
likeness of things that at first appear different in order to fit within precedent.
16. It is impossible to discuss abortion without identifying the sides to the debate. But
how to identify each side is itself a loaded rhetorical question. After agonizing over
the array of choices, all of which seem problematic, I will use the term "anti-
abortion" for those who want access to abortion limited to a few narrowly defined
circumstances such as rape, incest, or saving the mother's life, and the term "pro-
choice" for those who want access to at least early abortions left to the woman's
unfettered discretion.
17. "The very deliberate choice of war rhetoric [in the abortion debate] perfectly
embodies the message that this is a war with battles to be fought, skirmishes to be
won or lost, an enemy to be defeated, and lives at stake." Annette E. Clark, Abor-
tion and the Pied Piper of Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 265, 298 (1993) (foot-
note omitted).
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and minds of the nation.
I. SLAVERY RHETORIC IN THE ABORTION DEBATE
Pro-choice advocates have analogized the situation of the pregnant
woman denied access to abortion to that of the slave. Both pregnant
woman and slave, so the argument on this side runs, endure a condi-
tion of "forced labor."18 The argument that the "forced labor" of an
unwanted pregnancy is unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment,19 which prohibited the "forced labor" of the slave, has been
raised in litigation, albeit unsuccessfully.20
Andrew Koppelman has written the most thorough explanation of
this metaphor.21 He summarizes the argument thus: "Laws against abor-
tion define women as a servant caste and enforce that definition with
criminal sanctions. This is the same kind of injury that antebellum
slavery inflicted on blacks, and it therefore violates women's thirteenth
amendment rights."22
This metaphor, like all metaphors, highlights similarities while
obscuring differences. 23 Thus, under this argument, an unwanted preg-
nancy is like slavery in that both entail an element of compulsion, one
person being made to support another. Both can be perceived as a
shameful or humiliating condition, leading to a desire for escape, even
18. In this use of the metaphor, patriarchy stands in for the slave system; implicitly,
anti-abortion legislators stand in for the slaveholder.
19. The Thirteenth Amendment states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this artide by ap-
propriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
20. A Thirteenth Amendment argument was raised in an amicus brief in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), but the argument was rejected by the Court. See Andrew
Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense ofAbortion, 84 Nw. U.
L. Rav. 480, 484 n.24, 493 (1990). More recently, a similar argument was used in
the pre-Casey challenge to Utah's abortion law, and was likewise rejected by the
district court. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 1548-49 (D. Utah 1992).
See also Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828 F. Supp. 1544, 1554-55 (D. Utah 1993)
(characterizing plaintiffs' Thirteenth Amendment argument as "frivolous and
groundless").
21. Koppelman, supra note 20.
22. Koppelman, supra note 20, at 485.
23. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 10-13.
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if escape is unlawful. In both cases, "escape" historically has been sup-
ported by an extralegal "underground." Finally, both can involve feel-
ings of salvation and relief upon escape from the condition. 24 The
metaphor, however, masks the distinction that the slave had no choice
in the condition of slavery, while in most cases the woman had some
choice in the pregnancy. 25 In most cases slavery was a life-long condi-
tion, while pregnancy is of limited duration.26
The metaphor on the anti-abortion side of the debate is more
complex. It contains both an explicit and an implicit analogy. The
explicit analogy is between Roe v. Wade27 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.28
The implicit analogy is between an unborn child and a slave.
For anti-abortionists, Roe is the Dred Scott of our time. Roe held
that the Constitution protects a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy prior to viability.29 Dred Scott held that the descendants of
African slaves were not citizens,30 and further, that a slave did not be-
come free even after he or she had resided in a state or territory
prohibiting slavery.31 Ronald Reagan compared the two cases, stating:
"[Roe] is not the first time our country has been divided by a Supreme
Court decision that denied the value of certain human lives. The Dred
24. Compare HARRIET JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL (1861) (narra-
ting story of her escape fram slavery) with ELLEN MESSER & KATHRYN E. MAY,
BAcIooMs: VoICEs FROM THE II.EGAL ABORTION ERA (1988) (narrating stories of
women who had illegal abortions).
25. Obviously, the woman's part in the pregnancy covers a wide spectrum of actions,
some of which can be described as chosen, some of which are not likely to be so
described. A pregnancy resulting from rape is in no sense a consequence of the
woman's choice, while a pregnancy resulting from unprotected intercourse could be
described as a preventable, even if unintended, consequence of the woman's choice.
Unpacking "choice" even further, we can ask how free the choice to engage in
unprotected intercourse was; the question remains relevant because for some
women, in some circumstances, there is a significant disparity in power between the
sexes, rendering the concept of choice vis-t-vis sexual intercourse problematic. See,
e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRSEs ON LIFE
AND LAw 61 (1987) ("Those who think that one chooses heterosexuality under
conditions that make it compulsory should either explain why it is not compulsory
or explain why the word choice can be meaningful here.").
26. "Motherhood" in the sense of having a child, however, is life-long, even for mothers
who give up their children for adoption.
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54 (constitution protects woman's decision to terminate
pregnancy); 163-64 (state may proscribe abortion after viability).
30. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 425-26.
31. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452-53.
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Scott decision of 1857 was not overturned in a day, or a year, or even a
decade."32
Imbedded within the explicit analogy between Roe and Dred Scott,
however, is the implicit comparison between unborn child and slave.
Just as the law denied the humanity of the slave in the years before the
Civil War, so the argument goes, the law denies the personhood of the
unborn child by allowing abortion. George Swan articulated this anal-
ogy between unborn child and slave in a 198o law review article in
which he argues that abortion violates the Thirteenth Amendment
because the unborn child's life is subject to the will of another, the
mother.33
Again, the metaphor both highlights and obscures. The unborn
child is like the slave in that both exist at the will of another, both have
no or few legal rights, and both had no choice regarding their condi-
tion. What the metaphor obscures is that "fetushood" is both temporary
and common to all humans, while slavery was mostly permanent and
limited to a certain class. Moreover, slaves were compelled to work for
another, while the unborn child is not similarly exploited.
The anti-abortion metaphor appears in Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion 34 in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.35
In Casey, the Court reaffirmed the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade,
"the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability
and to obtain it without undue interference from the State." 36
Justice Scalia compares the Casey decision to the nineteenth-cen-
tury case of Dred Scott, which he refers to several times throughout his
dissent. He quotes a "warning" from the dissent in Dred Scott about the
dangers of abandoning a strict interpretation of the Constitution, which
32. RONA) REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 19 (1984),
quoted in, CELESTE M. CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING
SOCIAL CHANGE 50 (1990), also quoted in, EUZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FPEEMAN,
THE PoLmCs OF VRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? 10 (1993).
33. George S. Swan, The Thirteenth Amendment Dimensions of Roe v. Wade, 4 J. Juv.
L. 1 (1980). Note that the mother becomes analogous to the slaveholder in this
metaphor.
34. For an excellent discussion of Justice Scalia's dissent, see Jamin B. Raskin, Roe v.
Wade and the Dred Scott Decision: Justice Scalia'r Peculiar Analogy in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 1 Am. U. J. GENDER & L 61 (1993) (arguing that Roe and
Dred Scott are methodological and jurisprudential opposites and not analogous).
35. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
36. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
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he then applies to Casey's plurality opinion.37 Later, he criticizes the
Court's stance that reaffirming Roe was necessary because any other
course would subvert the Court's authority. Scalia argues that, on the
contrary, "the Court was covered with dishonor and deprived of legiti-
macy by Dred Scott ... an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion
that it did not abandon ... "38
Finally, Scalia subtly invokes an analogy between abortion and
slavery in a remarkable passage. He begins by opining that, given
Casey's "length, and what might be called its epic tone,"39 the Court
believed that its decision would end the abortion controversy. He then
launches into what at first seems to be a non sequitur: the description
of a portrait hanging in Harvard Law School. The passage is worth
quoting in full:
There comes vividly to mind a portrait by Emanuel
Leutze that hangs in the Harvard Law School: Roger Brooke
Taney, painted in 1859, the 82d year of his life, the 24th of his
Chief Justiceship, the second after his opinion in Dred Scott.
He is all in black, sitting in a shadowed red armchair, left
hand resting upon a pad of paper in his lap, right hand hang-
ing limply, almost lifelessly, beside the inner arm of the chair.
He sits facing the viewer, and staring straight out. There
37. As Scalia states:
Justice Curtis's warning is as timely today as it was 135 years ago:
[When a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the
fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and
the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its mean-
ing, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of
individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the
Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to
mean.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2876 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393, 621 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting)).
38. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2883. Parenthetically, and ironically, Scalia suggests that Dred
Scott relied upon the same concept of substantive due process that the Casey
plurality relies upon to justify its abortion decision. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2883. But
cf Raskin, supra note 34, at 68 ("The essential holding in Dred Scott had nothing
to do with substantive due process. It was a jurisdictional decision, turning on
whether an African-American could be a federally recognized 'citizen' of a state for
the purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction in federal court." (footnotes
omitted)).
39. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885.
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seems to be on his face, and in his deep-set eyes, an ex-
pression of profound sadness and disillusionment. Perhaps he
always looked that way, even when dwelling upon the hap-
piest of thoughts. But those of us who know how the lustre
of his great Chief Justiceship came to be eclipsed by Dred
Scott cannot help believing that he had that case-its already
apparent consequences for the Court, and its soon-to-be-
played-out consequences for the Nation-burning on his
mind.40
The passage is remarkable for several reasons. First, Scalia gives a
reading of "profound sadness and disillusionment" to the portrait.41 A
survey of Taney portraits (which Scalia almost invites) reveals that
Taney almost invariably wore a lugubrious expression. 42 Assuming that
Taney is indeed depressed in the Leutze portrait, Scalia assigns his
sadness to the consequences of the Dred Scott decision, which he sees
"burning on [Taney's] mind."43 An equally plausible explanation could
be found in Taney's personal life, which in 1855 had been torn apart
when his wife and youngest daughter died just a few hours apart.44
Next, Scalia implies that Taney shared the view that "his great Chief
Justiceship [had been] eclipsed" by Dred Scott. It is not at all clear,
however, that Taney came to regret Dred Scott, even after the outbreak
of the Civil War.4 5 Finally, there is Scalia's simplistic suggestion that
the Dred Scott opinion "caused" the Civil War. While dissatisfaction
with the decision might legitimately be considered one of many factors
that led to armed insurrection, it was not the precipitating cause.46
Scalia's dissent is a perfect example of what Wetlaufer identifies as
40. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885.
41. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885.
42. Eg., FRANK B. LArHA, THE DRED SCOTT DECISION MARCH 6, 1857, at cover, 26
(1968); MARtIN SIEGEL, THE TANEY COURT 1836-1864, at 241 (1987); BERNARD C.
STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BRooKE TANEY: CHIEF JusrIcE oF THE UNIrTED STATES
SuPREmE COURT 418 (1922); CARL B. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY, facing 554
(1935); CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, ]illowing 236 (1974).
43. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885.
44. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LiAW AND PoLncs 558-59 (1978).
45. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 44, at 559-61 (documenting evidence that Taney's
fierce hostility to the anti-slavery cause arose from his loyalty to Southern lifestyle
and values).
46. FEHRENRACHER, supra note 44, at 562-67 (arguing that the Republican victory in
the 1860 presidential campaign was he precipitating cause of the secession crisis,
and that Dred Scott had no dear impact on Lincoln's victory).
(Vol. 2:3
1994] SLAVERY RHETORIC AND THE ABORTION DEBATE 11
"the rhetoric of politics and not the rhetoric of law."47 By comparing
Casey to Dred Scott, Scalia implies that future generations will castigate
the Casey opinion for its refusal to recognize fetal rights, just as future
generations criticized Dred Scott for its failure to recognize the slave's
rights.48 Perhaps Justice Scalia meant to compare the Dred Scott Court's
refusal to allow the states to resolve the slavery issue with the Roe
Court's refusal to allow the states to resolve the abortion issue. How-
ever, the heightened rhetoric of his dissent suggests that he intended to
tap into the more emotional issues of personhood that underlie both
cases.
II. EFFECTIVE RHETORIC
In one sense, the reference to slavery in the abortion context is ap-
propriate. Not since the national debates over slavery has this country
found itself so divided over an issue involving fundamental concepts of
personhood. Moreover, both issues have created intense disagreement
whether the issue should be resolved politically, by the elected represen-
tatives, or judicially, by the courts.
At the same time, this appropriation of the image of the slave is
curiously ironic because it occurs in the privileged discourse of law. By
privileged, I mean that legal discourse is largely limited in its ac-
cessibility. To be fluent in "legalese," it is ordiiiarily necessary to have
attended law school,49 which is a post-graduate institution of limited
47. Wedaufer, supra note 1, at 1563 ("Thus we find the dissenting justice speaking
directly to the people, Congress, and lawyers of the future, speaking against dosure,
and seeking to cause people to identify with his position and to change what is now
the law.").
48. See Raskin, supra note 34, at 64 ("Justice Scalia dresses up and takes to Court the
pro-life movement's pet analogy between the nineteenth-century right to own slaves
and the twentieth-century right to have an abortion." (footnote omitted)).
49. Many beginning law students have shared the experience of being unable to com-
prehend the first case assigned:
OK. It was nine o'dock when I started reading. The case is four pages
long and at 10:35 I finally finished. It was something like stirring con-
crete with my eyelashes. I had no idea what half the words meant. I must
have opened Black's Law Dictionary twenty-five times and I still can't
understand many of the definitions. There are notations and numbers
throughout the case whose purpose baffles me. And even now I'm not
crystal-clear on what the court finally decided to do.
ScowT TuROW, ONE L 31 (1977).
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enrollment5o and considerable expense. 51 Thus, the legal discourse of
cases, statutes, and law review articles employs a language addressed to
and used by an "elite."
By privileged, I also mean that legal discourse is the language of
power, the power to deny or recognize rights. The abortion debate is a
struggle between two competing images of power and rights. The pro-
choice side focuses on the rights of the individual woman, giving her
the power to end her pregnancy. The anti-abortion side focuses on the
rights of the fetus, denying the woman's power to end the pregnancy.52
The slave, legally defined as chattel or property, had "no rights
which the white man was bound to respect," 53 and thus the slave is the
"image" of legal powerlessness. It seems strange that both sides in this
power struggle should want to appropriate the quintessential image of
powerlessness.
The strangeness of the appropriation fades, however, if the use of
slavery is evaluated from the perspective of rhetoric. From this perspec-
tive, the "slave" can be seen as an extraordinarily persuasive metaphor
because it can include all three types of appeals: logical, emotional, and
ethical.54
A. Appeal to Logic
Pro-choice rhetoric analogizes the woman faced with an unwanted
pregnancy to the slave. The logical appeal hidden within this analogy
runs something like this: a slave is compelled to render services for
another; prohibiting abortion compels the pregnant woman to render
service to another, the unwanted child; therefore, a woman who is
compelled to bear an unwanted child is a slave.55
Conversely, anti-abortion rhetoric analogizes the unborn child and
the slave. The implicit logical appeal is: a slave is a living individual
50. In 1993, A.B.A-accredited law schools had a combined first-year enrollment of
37,344 full-time and 6,300 part-time students. SECTION OF LEAoa. EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO aE BAR, A.BA, A REvIEw OF LE.AL EDuCATION IN TI UNIrED
STATES, FALL 1993, at 66 (1994) [hereinafter RvIEw oF LECAL EDUCATION].
51. In 1993, tuitions at A.B.A.-accredited law schools ranged from approximately
$1,300 to approximately $20,000 annually. REvIEw OF LEcxL EDUCATION, supra
note 50, at 4-63.
52. This is an example of how "rights talk" breeds counter-rights. See, e.g., CAROL
SMART, FEMINIsM AND TIE POWER OF LAW 146-52 (1989).
53. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
54. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
55. See Koppelman, supra note 20, at 484-85.
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who is legally compelled to hold his life at the will of another; the
unborn are living individuals whose lives are held at the will of others;
therefore, unborn children are slaves. 56
B. Appeal to the Emotions
Images of the slave and the abuses of slavery carry a powerful emotional
charge for white and black people in this country. Harriet Beecher
Stowe's fictional slave narrative, Uncle Tom's Cabin,57 "became the
second most popular book in the world after the Bible."58 One need
look no further than the success of the novel and mini-series Roots59 to
see evidence of the continuing hold which slavery has on our collective
imaginations. The power that this imagery still holds was also revealed
in Justice Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings, where Justice
Thomas successfully defended himself by invoking a lynching metaphor
rooted in the abuses of slavery.60 The image of the slave in the abortion
debate taps into this same emotional history.
C. Appeal to Ethics
In their recent book, Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman explore the
"peculiar political power" of two other metaphors that appear in abor-
tion rhetoric: Nazism and the civil rights movement. 61 They point out
56. Swan, supra note 33, at 4.
57. HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN (1851-52).
58. E.L. Doctorow, Out of the Parlor and into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., Feb.
13, 1994, at 3, 33 (reviewing Joan D. Hedrick's Harriet Beecher Stowe: A Life).
59. ALEx HALEY, RoOTs (1976); Roots (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 23-30, 1977).
60. In a prepared statement, Thomas stated:
I think that this today is a travesty. .. And from my standpoint, as a
black American ... it is a message that unless you kowtow to an old
order, this is what will happen to you. You will be lynched ... by a
committee of the U.S. Senate rather than hung from a tree.
Judge Thomas'Evening Statement to the Committee, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 12, 1991, at
A12, quoted in, Catharine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S.
CAL. L. Rnv. 117, 138-39 (1993).
61. MENSCH & FREEMAN, supra note 32, at 9. Other metaphors operate in the abortion
debate as well. See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, When Human Rights Conflict: Two Persons,
One Body in, DEFnInNG Hu AN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLCATONS
225, 229-37 (Margary W. Shaw & A. Edward Doudera eds., 1983) (discussing
several pregnancy analogies: Siamese twins, multiple personalities, and the well-
known analogy devised by Judith Jarvis Thomson involving a famous violinist
whose survival depends on being attached to another's kidneys for nine months);
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that both sides of the abortion debate have employed these images "to
recapture the moral certainty"62 those images create:
To name one's opponent a Nazi, with any credibility, is to
suspend the usual rules of discursive engagement. The Nazi is
denied respect, subjected to name-calling, vulnerable to extra-
legal tactics, and must be opposed by all persons of conscience
and good will.... Similarly, if inversely, to appropriate to
one's cause the aura of the civil rights movement is to
demand the unquestioning allegiance of people of goodwill
and conscience, to call for a vigorous and singular activism.
That activism may include civil disobedience or other extra-
legal activity, for even formally legitimate legal obstacles are
rendered fundamentally illegal.6 3
The slave image contains within itself both the reflexive disgust trig-
gered by the Nazi image and the equally reflexive support triggered by
the civil rights image. To name someone a Simon Legree64 is to
demonize him in the same way as naming him a Nazi, while the aboli-
tionists claim the same high ground as the civil rights movement.
The slave metaphor also appeals to the same sense of moral cer-
tainty. I suspect that most white people today believe that they would
have opposed slavery had they been living in antebellum times. Perhaps
they would have, but perhaps they are underestimating the power of
racism. In fact, history provides many examples of lawyers who believed
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Vuual Culture in the Politics
of Reproduction, 13 FEmimNST STUD. 263, 268 (1987) (fetus as a homunculus); Zoe
Sofia, Exterminating Fetuses: Abortion, Disarmament, and the Sexo-Semiotics of
Extraterrestriaism, DIACrMCS, Summer 1984, at 47, 56 (fetus as an astronaut in an
interuterine space ship).
62. MENSCH & FREmaAN, supra note 32, at 9.
63. MFNscH & FREEmAN, supra note 32, at 9. The authors also note that the com-
parison between abortion and Nazism may be offensive to some Jews, as it trivial-
izes the Holocaust and "debasefs] Jewish history by exploiting it for sectarian
Christian goals." MENSCH & FREEmAN, supra note 32, at 26. See also MENsCH &
FREmAN, supra note 32, at 171 n. 11. Analogous arguments can be made about the
comparisons between abortion and slavery. See infra notes 70-71, 80-82, 84-86
and accompanying text.
Curiously, Mensch and Freeman do not explore the slave image, except for one
passing mention: "For the pro-life side, fetuses are not just victims, but also persons
awaiting legal recognition of their true personhood, like slaves before the Civil War
." MENSCH & FREEMAN, supra note 32, at 10.
64. Simon Legree is the villain of Uncle Tom's Cabin, the man responsible for the
death of Uncle Tom. BEECHER STOWE, supra note 57.
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slavery was wrong and yet found themselves "bound by law" to uphold
it.65 Nevertheless, because today we do have consensus on the issue of
slavery, it looks "easy" and we "know" which was the side of the angels.
Once the analogy, either between the slave and the pregnant woman or
between the slave and the unborn child, is accepted, the resolution of
the abortion question becomes "easy" because we now know which side
is right.
III. A PROBLEMATIC METAPHOR
Racism infected both sides of the slavery question. Slaveowners justified
their subjugation of their slaves by claiming that the African was
naturally inferior.66 Many abolitionists, although opposed to the con-
cept of owning another human being, "drew the line at social equality
between the races," 67 and often refused to live or work with freed
African Americans. 68
The poison of racism lingers to this day. Therefore, the question
65. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
230 (1975). In antebellum times, one could find judges who took the position that,
although they personally disapproved of the institution and would never themselves
own slaves, they lacked the tight to outlaw slavery. See State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263,
268 (1829) (abolitionist judge determines he is compelled "to recognise the full
dominion of the owner over the slave"). One can draw comparisons, and the anti-
abortionists do, with those who identify as pro-choice, but nevertheless express
disapproval of abortion and would never themselves consider having one.
66. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). In Dred Scott, Chief Justice
Taney, himself a former slave owner who had manumitted his slaves, referred to
slaves "as beings of an inferior order ... altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect ..... Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
67. SHIRLEY J. YEE, BLACK WOMEN ABOLITIONISTS: A STUDY IN AcTIVsM, I8Z8-i86o,
at 90 (1992).
68. One historian of the Dred Scott decision has stated: "For proof of the Negro's
degraded status, [Taney] relied heavily upon examples taken from the free states.
Without the northern record of increasing discrimination he would have found it
much more difficult to exclude Negroes from citizenship." FEHRENBACHER, supra
note 44, at 5. See also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 44, at 429 ("The record of racial
discrimination throughout most of the North laid [Northern anti-slavery
Republicans] open to charges of hypocrisy in their expressions of sympathy for the
slave ... ."). Fehrenbacher also quotes from what he identifies as Abraham Lin-
coln's first public comment on Dred Scott, where Lincoln argued that miscegenation
was an evil by-product of slavery and refeired to the "natural disgust in the minds
of nearly all white people, to the idea of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the
white and black races." FEHRENBACHER, supra note 44, at 436.-Lincoln ended by
"disclaiming any wish to have a Negro woman either for a slave or for a wife."
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 44, at 436.
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must be raised whether racism underlies the current use of the slave
metaphor in the abortion debate.
Slavery rhetoric in the abortion debate turns upon the use of
metaphor: either the pregnant woman is like the slave, or the unborn
child is like the slave. Whether one focuses on pregnant women or
unborn children, by comparing them to slaves the message is that they
have been wronged, that their rights must be recognized, and that they
must be protected. Shifting the focus off the pregnant woman and the
unborn child and onto the slave, however, sends a different message:
slavery is like an unwanted pregnancy; the slave is like a fetus. Focusing
on what these metaphors say about the African-American slave high-
lights the hidden racial content of the messages. 69
A. An Objectionable Comparison
When anti-abortionists argue, as one law professor recently did, that the
"small, voiceless, defenseless, and completely vulnerable" unborn child
makes "the same silent claim on our social and moral responsibilities
that Southern slaves made to Northern abolitionists,"70 the imbedded
message about African Americans is objectionable. To analogize the
slave to the helpless, irrational (because pre-rational), voiceless and
utterly dependent fetus reflects, at best, an unconscious paternalism and,
at worst, a comparison that is as offensive as the antebellum legal
analogy of the slave to a horse or cow. 71
The fetus is voiceless and depeuident, not because the law renders
it so, but because the fetus has not developed biologically to that point
where speech or autonomy is possible. Some nineteenth-century
slaveholders argued that African slaves were dependent72 because as a
69. Cf ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLAss 34 (1981) (In comparing marriage to
slavery, nineteenth-century white women "seem to have ignored ...that their
identification of the two institutions also implied that slavery was really no worse
than marriage.").
70. Lynn D. Wardle, Hiding Behind a False Moraity, NETWORK, Dec. 1992, at 4 (Letter
to the Editor). (Lynn Wardle is a professor at the J. Reuben Clark School of Law,
Brigham Young University.) He has also compared the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act with attempts in the 1830s to suppress anti-slavery publications and
petitions. See Lynn D. Wardle, Pro-Life Speech Curb Is Modern 'Gag Rule,' SALT
LAKE Crrv TfaB., June 10, 1994, at A23. For other examples of anti-abortion
rhetoric that uses the analogy between fetus and slave, see Raskin, supra note 34, at
64 n.11.
71. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
72. Such a description is of course problematic, as it could just as accurately be said
that the white plantation owner was dependent on the unpaid labor of his slaves.
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race they had not developed as far as whites, but today we see that, to
the extent we can describe slaves as "dependent," that dependency was
the consequence of law and society, and not of biological constraints.
The criticism directed toward the hidden racial content of the
fetus/slave analogy became public during Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
confirmation hearings.73 During the questioning of then Judge Ginsburg
on the subject of abortion, Senator Orrin Hatch drew some of the same
connections between Roe and Dred Scott that Justice Scalia had used in
his Casey dissent.74 Senator Carol Moseley-Braun interrupted, saying that
she found his line of questioning "personally offensive," that as "the only
descendant of a slave ... in this body' she found it "very difficult...
to sit here and ... quietly listen to a debate that would analogize Dred
Scott and Roe v. Wade."75 It would be a mistake, of course, to generalize
from Senator Moseley-Braun's comments; she was not speaking on behalf
of all blacks. The point is, however, that the analogy between slave and
fetus has the power to offend.
B. Feminism s Failure of Inclusivity
As a white, pro-choice, feminist,76 I am more concerned with, and
more troubled by, a similar critique of the analogy between the preg-
nant woman and the slave. The pro-choice side of the abortion debate,
and feminists more generally, have been criticized for fostering racism
and classism because they tend to focus on issues important to white,
73. Transcript to Confirmation Hearings of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Fed. News
Serv., July 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News & Bus. Libr. Fed. News Serv. File
[hereinafter Confirmation Hearings].
74. While questioning Judge Ginsburg, Senator Hatch stated: "But in my view, it's impos-
sible as a matter of principal to distinguish Dred Scott v. Sanford [sic] ... from the
court's substantive due process privacy cases like Roe v. Wade. The methodology is
the same. The difference is only in the results, which hinge on the personal, subjective
values of the judge deciding the case." Confirmation Hearings, supra note 73.
75. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 73.
76. Wedaufer notes that:
Mhe legal scholar adopts a voice that is objective, neutral, impersonal,
authoritative, judgmental, and certain. It is a disembodied voice that
implicitly denies any contingency upon the cultural or personal cir-
cumstances of the author... If we anywhere acknowledge our personal
relationship to the problems about which we are writing, we do so not in
the text, not even in a note to the text, but in the author's note.... By
this avoidance of the personal voice, we preserve the rhetorical integrity of
our implicit daim that what we say in the text is objective, neutral,
noncontingent, and wholly rational.
Wedaufer, supra note 1, at 1568-69 (citations omitted).
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middle-class women.77 As Charlotte Rutherford has noted, for many
poor women, who are disproportionately women of color, the "right" to
abortion has looked more like a "privilege" reserved for those who
could afford it.7s Some support for this criticism can be found in the
rhetoric of the plurality opinion in Casey, which states: "The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives." 79 It is not hard to imagine those "women" who are participating
"equally" in the "economic and social life of the Nation" as being
primarily white, educated, and middle-class.
Some have argued that racism underlies the pro-choice side's use of
the slave metaphor. According to Joyce McConnell, in her article
Beyond Metaphor,80 "[n]o matter how rhetorically useful this metaphor
["women are slaves"] may ... seem now, it . . . remains grossly inac-
curate and inherently racist."81 There are actually two prongs to her
critique. One prong argues that the analogy between an unwanted
pregnancy and slavery is inappropriate because, no matter how repug-
nant the idea of forced pregnancy may be, it is not comparable to a
lifetime of slavery.82 The descendants of slaves could be offended by the
77. "[W]omen of color have not always had access to the pro-choice movement. In the
past, it has been difficult for many middle-class white feminists to understand and
include the different perspectives and experiences of poor and minority women."
Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women,
11 WomEN's RTs. L. REP. 15, 16 (1989). See also DAVIs, supra note 69, at 202,
202-06 (1981) (many minority women support abortion rights while deploring
social conditions that preclude them from having children); Dorothy E. Roberts,
The Future of Reproductive Choice for Poor Women and Women of Color, 12
WoMN's RTs. L. REP. 59 (1990) [hereinafter Roberts, Future of Choice] (discussing
ways in which choice is compromised by issues of race and class); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privaq, 104 HARv. L. Rnv. 1419, 1424 (1991) [hereinafter Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts] ("Much of the literature discussing reproductive freedom
has adopted a white middle-class perspective, which focuses narrowly on abortion
tights."); Charlotte Rutherford, Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women,
4 YALE J.L & FEmism 255 (1992).
78. Rutherford, supra note 77, at 281. See also Roberts, Future of Choice, supra note 77,
at 64 (noting that for poor women, Roe "is worse than an abstract right; it is a cruel
deception").
79. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809
(1992).
8o. Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and
the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J. L. & FEmINIsM 207 (1992).
81. McConnell, supra note 80, at 207-08.
82. McConnell, supra note 80, at 208.
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comparisons to slavery that surface in the abortion debate because, from
their perspective, there is no equivalency. To suggest that the life-long
and all-encompassing condition of the slave is comparable to the temp-
orary condition of pregnancy, or to imply that the degradation and
abuse that slaves endured is comparable to the impositions of an un-
wanted pregnancy, can be seen as trivializing the enormity of the injury
that generations of slavery inflicted upon African Americans.
The defenders of the pregnant woman/slave metaphor would no
doubt argue, as Koppelman has done, that while "Itihe injury inflicted
on women by forced motherhood is lesser in degree than that inflicted
on blacks by antebellum slavery, since it is temporary and involves less
than total control over the body," nevertheless, "it is the same kind of
injury."8 3 This argument, however, does not address the other, more
troubling, aspect of McConnell's critique.
The second prong of her criticism is that the slave metaphor
ignores the historical truth that white women benefited from the slave
system at the expense of African-American women.84 McConnell char-
ges that white women, who benefited as a class from the institution,
exploit black history when they argue that compelled motherhood is
slavery.85 Susan Sniader Lanser, a literary scholar, makes the same point
when she refers to "the problematic history of white women's appropri-
ation of slavery by analogy," by which she means "the use of analogies
with slavery not as a way of combating slavery but as a way of legiti-
mating women's rights."8 6
This "history of appropriation" extends back over i5o years, to the
middle of the nineteenth century. Sniader Lanser voiced her critique in
a discussion of an 1832 text in which the author referred to a housewife
as a "menial slave."87 As early as 1838, Sarah and Angelina Grimk6 had
drawn the comparison between the status of women and slaves.88 At
s. Koppelman, supra note 20, at 487.
84. McConnell, supra note 80, at 208.
85. Cf MENsCH & FREMAN, supra note 32, at 26 (comparing abortion to the
Holocaust illegitimately appropriates the suffering of European Jewry).
86. SUSAN SNaUaR LA sER, FICTIONS OF AuTmoiau-m WOMEN W=-rs AND NAmnn-
TWE VoiCE 14, 14 n.21 (1992).
87. SN1ADER LANSER, supra note 86, at 14. Sniader Lanser suggests that as the text was
published in Philadelphia, where both white and black women were involved in
abolitionist activities, "the reference ... may be more than casual." SNIADER
LANSER, supra note 86, at 14.
88. "The various laws [in the United States] ... leave women very little more liberty,
or power... than the slave." SARAH GmrMIc, LTrRs ON THE EQuALIIy OF THE
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the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848, the first public meeting on
women's rights (which no black women attended),8 9 patriarchal mar-
riage was described as giving the husband the rights of a slaveowner
over the wife.90 After the Civil War, slavery/freedom became the "ruling
paradigm" of the women's rights movement.91
The appropriation of the slave image by early feminists "grew
naturally from the early ties with the abolitionist movement."92 In the
184os and 185os, the movements for women's rights and the rights of
African Americans overlapped to a considerable degree. To a great
extent, the suffragists were veterans of the abolitionist movement.93 For
many suffragists, their speaking and campaigning against slavery became
their initiation to "public" life.94
But the appropriation of slavery rhetoric was also problematic; as
Sniader Lanser has observed, feminists' use of the slave analogy "tended
to work more to the benefit of white women than to that of slaves."95
During the same period of overlap between suffragism and abolition,
the tensions between suffragism and black civil rights were also becom-
ing visible.96 Sexism appeared in the way women were frequently rele-
gated to "supporting" functions in abolitionist societies. "By the mid-
183os, abolitionists engaged in heated debates about whether women
SEX S AND OTHER EsSAYS 77 (E. Bartlett ed., 1988), quoted in Dianne Avery &
Alfred S. Konefsky, The Daughters ofjob: Property Rights and Women's Lives in Mid-
Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, 10 L & Hisr. REV. 323, 329 (1992). See also
DAvis, supra note 69, at 30-45.
89. DAvis, supra note 69, at 57; YEE, supra note 67, at 140.
90. "[The wife] is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all
intents and purposes, her master-the law giving him power to deprive her of her
liberty, and to administer chastisement." Report of the Women's Rights Convention
Held at Seneca Falls, New York, July 19-20, 1848, at 6 (reprint, New York, 1969),
quoted in EuzABEnH CLARK, MATRIMONIAL BONDS: SLAVERY, CoNTRACT AND THE
LAWS OF DiVORCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1 (Inst. for Legal Studies,
Legal History Program Working Papers Series No. 1, No. 10, 1987).
91. Clark, supra note 90, at 11. As an example, Clark notes that an article in the
women's paper, The Revolution, was entitled The Slavery of Woman. Clark, supra
note 90, at 13.
92. Clark, supra note 90, at 11. See also DAvis, supra note 69, at 39-40 (describing how
the abolitionist movement raised white, middle-class women's consciousness about
their own oppression and gave them the political skills to challenge it).
93. YEE, supra note 67, at 137.
94. DAvis, supra note 69, at 39-40.
95. SNLADER LANSER, supra note 86, at 14 n.21. See also YEE, supra note 67, at 136
(noting that white women abolitionists did not always acknowledge their own
racism).
96. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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should participate in 'male' activities for the sake of the cause." 97 In
1840, after a woman was elected to the Business Committee of the
American Anti-Slavery Society, those opposed to linking the "woman
question" to the issue of slavery walked out of the convention and
organized a rival abolitionist group.98
Racism appeared in the way white suffragists prioritized their
issues. By 1854, the black abolitionist Frederick Douglass, who con-
sidered himself a "women's rights man,"99 was publicly quarrelling with
white suffragists who spoke to audiences from which African Americans
were banned. 100 As was noted above, some abolitionist societies ex-
cluded blacks; others included blacks but members sat in halls
segregated by race. 10 1
After the Civil War, with the push for the adoption of the Fif-
teenth Amendment which would give African-American men the right
to vote, the tensions between gender and race came to the forefront.102
By 1869, "political expedience" caused most black men, including
Frederick Douglass, to abandon women's suffrage.103 Suppressed racism
rose to the surface as some white, middle- and upper-class suffragists
voiced outrage that uneducated African-American men might receive
the vote before they did. 104 Some even went so far as to make common
cause with former slaveowners by arguing that, if women were given
the vote, the combined white vote would defeat the combined black
97. YEE, supra note 67, at 7.
98. YEE, supra note 67, at 7; FREDERICK DOUGLASS, FREDERICK DOUGLASS ON
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 7 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1976).
99. Douglass' abolitionist paper, The North Star, always carried the masthead slogan:
"Right is of no sex." DOUGLASS, supra note 98, at 12.
i0. "When she learned that colored people were to be excluded from her lecture ...
Miss Stone should have felt herself excluded." DOUGLASS, supra note 98, at 68.
101. YEE, supra note 67, at 95.
102. DAvis, supra note 69, at 70.
103. YEE, supra note 67, at 138, 147.
104. In late 1865, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, objecting to suffrage for black men without
suffrage for women, wrote:
[N]ow, as the celestial gate to civil rights is slowly moving on its hinges,
it becomes a serious question whether we had better stand aside and see
'Sambo' walk into the kingdom first... In fact, it is better to be the
slave of an educated white man, than of a degraded, ignorant black
one ....
DAvis, supra note 69, at 70-71. See also DOUGLASS, supra note 98, at 26. See
generally YE, supra note 67, at 90-95, 105, 140-41, 149 (discussing racism in the
movement for women's suffrage).
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The racism of white feminists and the sexism of black male leaders
put black women in a difficult position.10 6a A few, like Sojourner Truth,
addressed both issues by speaking out to white suffragists about their
racism and to black male civil rights leaders about their sexism. 107
Others, if forced to choose, supported civil rights over "the lesser ques-
tion of sex."108 But, it is likely that many others were silenced by the
dual betrayal, from white women and black men, and torn by their
sense of conflicting loyalties.
Given such historical tensions, it behooves pro-choice white
women using the slavery metaphor to ask whether they are being racist.
The unthinking appropriation of the slave metaphor by white women
for their own political purposes is symptomatic of a larger problem: too
often when we speak of "women's rights," the women we are thinking
of are all white. As Sniader Lanser has noted, "contemporary analogies
between 'women' and 'blacks' . . . risk erasing black women because
'women) comes to imply white women, and 'blacks,' black men." 10 9
White women must also question whether the interests of African-
American women are being incorporated into the reproduction debate.
Some African-American women look at the statistics for teenage preg-
nancies and want the emphasis shifted from abortion to education and
access to contraception. 1 0 Some see other reproductive issues, such as
the disproportionate number of women of color who have been steril-
ized,11' or who have lost custody of their children, 112 and the high
105. DOUGLASS, supra note 98, at 30.
lo. YEE, supra note 67, at 149.
107. DAvis, supra note 69, at 60-64 (discussing Sojourner Truth's famous "Ain't I a
Woman?" speech, in which she spoke to both racist oppression and sexist domina-
tion); YEE, supra note 67, at 141 (discussing Sojourner Truth's "Ain't I a Woman?"
speech); YEE, supra note 67, at 150 (describing a speech of Sojourner Truth's in
which she spoke to sexism: "[You men] think, like a slaveholder, that you own
us.").
108. DoUGAss, supra note 98, at 36 (quoting a description of an 1869 speech by black
activist Frances Ellen Watkins Harper).
109. SNUDEiR LANSER, supra note 86, at 14 n.21.
110. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 77, at 19-20.
111. See DAvis, supra note 69, at 215-21 (citing 1970s data suggesting that 20% of all
married black women, 35% of all Puerto Rican women, and 24% of all Native
American women have been sterilized).
112. See Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 77, at 1427-42. Roberts gives a
thoroughly researched discussion of how race and class impact loss of maternal
custody. For example, although rates of drug abuse may be constant between
populations, abuse by women of color is more likely to be reported and prosecuted,
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mortality rate for children of color,113 and wonder whether the issue
should not be support for motherhood among women of color.114
Many wonder why the legality of abortion should command the lion's
share of the energy and resources of the "women's" movement, when
that "choice" is beyond the economic reach of many women of color 1 5
CONCLUSION
Given both the rhetorical usefulness of the slavery metaphor and the
problematic nature of its racial message, the question inevitably arises:
should the slave metaphor be abandoned in the abortion debate?
Speaking as a feminist, when the long history of feminism's blind-
ness to its own racism and classism is considered, a positive answer
seems inescapable. This conclusion does not, however, preclude the
possibility of arguing for a Thirteenth Amendment basis for abortion
rights. The Amendment, after all, prohibits "involuntary servitude" as
well as slavery.1 6 The objection is to the slave metaphor, not the use of
the Amendment. For example, Loretta Rossl" 7 has argued for the use of
the Thirteenth Amendment in defending abortion rights, and in so
doing has compared an unwanted pregnancy with involuntary servitude,
because women of color are disproportionately poor and the poor are generally
under greater governmental supervision. Additionally, racial attitudes may skew
qualitative judgments regarding mothering skills. Thus, maternal reliance upon
extended family or neighbors may be interpreted as neglect.
113. See Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 77, at 1446 (reporting that mor-
tality rate for black infants is more than twice that for whites; the leading cause is
inadequate prenatal care).
114. Cf Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 11 (1993) (noting that society devalues black motherhood).
115. See generally Roberts, Future of Choice, supra note 77.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Koppelman, supra note 20, at 486-93 (arguing
that involuntary servitude includes coerced pregnancy as the woman is compelled to
act for the fetus's benefit).
Arguing that an unwanted pregnancy is "involuntary servitude" could have
unintended consequences for surrogacy agreements; the doctrine could render such
agreements unenforceable. Recall that the freedom to contract does not extend to
contracting oneself into such servitude. See Koppelman, supra note 20, at 491-93
(labor contracts are compatible with Amendment only if they may be broken and
there is no compulsion to continue). But cf Koppelman, supra note 20, at 488
(assumes surrogacy is not involuntary servitude).
117. Loretta Ross is the national program director for the Center for Democratic
Renewal and formerly held positions with the National Black Women's Health
Program and the National Organization for Women.
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not slavery.118
Apart from its hidden racism, there is another problem with the
slave metaphor in abortion rhetoric. It polarizes and shuts down dia-
logue between the pro-choice and anti-abortion sides of the debate.
This polarization, in turn, leads each side to focus narrowly on the
assertion of rights and in the process to lose sight of the bigger picture.
For example, because of the pro-choice focus on the mere legal right to
abortion, we have seen the "de facto nonavailability of abortion for
many, with no additional social mechanisms in place to help women
cope with pregnancy."' 119 If more than a mere right to abortion is to
exist, the debate has to be refrained so that the issue is not incom-
mensurable. 120
The slavery metaphor, ironically, highlights this very problem.
Ending slavery did not end the racial inequities. Freedom, in light of
Reconstruction era policies, turned out to be hollow. Former slave-
owners, deprived of any participation in the process of emancipation,
retaliated by subverting the process through unfair contracts, Jim Crow
laws, and violence. 121
If we are to make the goal reproductive freedom, rather than
abortion, we have to move beyond polarizing rhetoric, such as the slave
metaphor. We need to search for common ground, perhaps by advocat-
118. Loretta Ross, Why Not Use the i3th and i4 th Amendments to Achieve Reproductive
Freedom?, in- REFLECTIONS AFTER CASEY: WOMEN LOOK AT THE STATuS OF
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERIcA 17 (Center for Constitutional Rights ed.,
1993). Ironically, in the same piece, Ross states: "Unless someone argues that
fetuses are slaves in the sense meant by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, [the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude] is a
much more secure basis on which to argue that women must have the same protec-
tions across the country .... ." Ross, supra, at 17. Cf. Swan, supra note 33, at 12
(arguing that fetuses are like slaves and thus protected by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment).
119. MENSCH & FREEMAN, supra note 32, at 150.
120. Compare Joan Williams, Abortion, Incommensurability, and Jurisprudence, 63 TuL. L.
Rav. 1651-72 (1989) (arguing that abortion is a classic and fundamental incom-
mensurability) with MENSCH & FREEMAN, supra note 32, at 13, 135 (arguing that
the "incommensurable" label obscures that both sides have moral points not
answered by opposing extremists and denies the possibility of compromise) and
Clark, supra note 17, at 299 (arguing that neither pro-choice nor anti-abortion
advocates speak for or to the "moral middle").
121. E.g., W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESsAY ToWARD A
HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO
RECONsT ucr DmaocRcy IN AMEIucA 186o-88o, at 673-75 (1962) (discussing
the inequities of sharecropping, the passage of laws limiting voting rights, and the
use of violence to intimidate the black population).
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ing increased access to contraception so that the need for abortion
decreases, or by advocating more societal support for motherhood-for
example, through better access to day-care-so that more women can
avoid recourse to abortion. The slave metaphor denies the possibility of
common ground, however, because there was no common ground
between slaveholder and abolitionist.
Rhetoric teaches that how we talk reveals who we are. If we aspire
to be a society that is sensitive to our history of racism and desires to
correct that history with a commitment to inclusivity, and if we aspire
to be a society that takes seriously both life, including the lives of the
unborn, and autonomy, including the autonomy of women, then we
need to find another way to talk about abortion. Slavery rhetoric focus-
es on abortion to the exclusion of other reproductive issues and contrib-
utes to the idea that abortion is the be-all and end-all of women's
reproductive freedom. We need to talk about abortion in a way that
keeps it in context, as one piece of a larger concern for reproductive
autonomy and the existence of meaningful choices for all women,
including choices to bear, as well as not to bear, children. t

